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After years of constancy or increase, private pension coverage 
rates declined during the 1980s. Because private pensions are an 
important source of retirement income, the decline in their coverage 
raises concern over the adequacy of future retirement income. 1 
Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of full-time male private sec 
tor employees participating in a pension plan fell from 55 to 51 per 
cent, where it remained in 1993 (Beller and Lawrence 1992; U.S. 
Department of Labor 1994).
The coverage decline was particularly large for young males. Cov 
erage for full-time male private sector employees aged 25 to 29 
declined by nearly a quarter, from 53 percent in 1979 to 41 percent by 
1993 (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
Because the decline in pension coverage rates has been particularly 
great for young males, researchers have looked for determinants of 
coverage that changed more for that group than for older males. 
Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even and Macpherson (1994) used 
this approach to argue that the decline in coverage for young males is 
explained primarily by disproportionately large declines in their union 
ization and contemporaneous real income. 2 The fact that marginal tax 
rates declined most for high-income workers while coverage declined 
most for younger low-income workers led these researchers to ignore 
the potentially important effect of contemporaneous declines in mar 
ginal tax rates. 3
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The tax code encourages both pension coverage and generosity by 
exempting pension savings from the double taxation associated with 
other savings vehicles (Turner 1981; Woodbury and Bettinger 1991; 
Woodbury and Hamermesh 1992; Gentry and Peress 1995). 4 Workers' 
earnings are taxed, for example, before they contribute to savings 
accounts. The returns on savings are again taxed when they are real 
ized (Munnel 1982). In contrast, pension contributions made by firms 
on behalf of workers are not taxed. Pension benefits are only taxed 
when they are disbursed, thereby avoiding double taxation.
Preferential tax treatment causes the tax advantage of pensions to 
increase with marginal income tax rates. Workers with high marginal 
tax rates tend to seek jobs with pensions, suggesting that pension cov 
erage was reduced by declines in marginal tax rates during the 1980s 
and early 1990s. Woodbury and Bettinger (1991) found that decreases 
in marginal tax rates did reduce pension coverage for a sample pooled 
by gender and age. Woodbury and Huang (1991) and Feldstein (1997) 
found that the large cuts in marginal income tax rates encouraged high- 
income workers to take less compensation as fringe benefits and more 
as income.5
Because the tax expenditure for pensions is the largest tax expendi 
ture for individuals in the federal budget, it is important to understand 
the effects of that expenditure on pension coverage. 6 The tax expendi 
ture for pensions could lead to increased national savings through 
increased pension coverage, but of itself reduces government revenue, 
reducing savings.
We examine whether the decline in marginal tax rates during the 
1980s caused a decline in pension coverage rates. We empirically test 
the assertion that tax changes cannot explain the disproportionate 
decline in coverage for young males because "the 1980s fall in cover 
age was smallest among high-income (older) workers, for whom mar 
ginal tax rates declined the most" (Bloom and Freeman 1992, p. 543). 
We explore causal links between declines in tax rates and observed 
declines in pension coverage using cross-sectional data over a 15-year 
period, from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 Current Population Surveys. 7
Our estimates suggest that, on average, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the marginal tax rate leads to a 0.4 percentage point 
increase in private pension coverage. Declining tax rates explain 
almost 20 percent of the total decline in coverage for young males
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between 1979 and 1988. Our model predicts that changes in exoge 
nous variables lowered coverage rates 7.3 percentage points for young 
males between 1979 and 1988. Declining tax rates account for 1.4 per 
centage points of the total predicted decline in coverage. Declining 
unionization accounts for only 0.9 percentage points of the predicted 
decline, whereas declining earnings account for 5.7 percentage points 
of the predicted decline.
We test the robustness of our results by reestimating the coverage 
equation for a sample of female private sector workers. In contrast to 
the males, who experienced declining coverage rates in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, females experienced slightly rising coverage rates during 
this period. Our results from the female sample corroborate our earlier 
conclusions that on average a 1 percentage point increase in the mar 
ginal tax rate leads roughly to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pen 
sion coverage.
In the next section, we discuss the empirical specification. We then 
discuss the data and variables, with special attention to the problem of 
endogeneity of tax rates, and we estimate our model for males and then 
for females. In the final section, we offer concluding comments.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Observed compensation packages consisting of wages and fringe 
benefits result from decisions made by firms and workers, subject to 
market and regulatory constraints. Woodbury (1983) and Woodbury 
and Huang (1991) estimated a demand equation for pensions as a share 
of total compensation. They modeled the determinants of pension pro 
vision and other nonwage compensation by assuming that employers 
offer a menu of compensation packages, given their costs. Utility- 
maximizing workers then choose their preferred compensation pack 
ages from the menu of available alternatives. As suggested by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980), the authors cited above specified a flexible 
form expenditure function, from which they derive a system of demand 
equations for wages and pension benefits as a share of total compensa 
tion. Since share data are more readily available at the firm level, they 
variously used the establishment and the two-digit industry as the unit
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of observation. Explanatory variables are firm or industry average 
characteristics.
Other studies, such as Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), Bloom and 
Freeman (1992), and Even and Macpherson (1994), focused on 
accounting for changes over time in observed coverage rates. These 
studies used household data and the individual as the unit of observa 
tion. Household data sets, however, do not contain information about 
the amount that the firm contributes to an individual's retirement pen 
sion. The data available are discrete and measure whether an employer 
offers a pension and, if so, whether the employee participates in the 
plan. These authors estimated a discrete model of the probability that a 
worker with given economic and demographic characteristics, 
employed at a firm with given attributes, is covered by a pension. The 
coverage equation is interpreted as the probability of a pension cover 
age outcome and is not interpreted as a behavioral equation. The esti 
mated coefficients in the coverage equation, appropriately transformed, 
measure the effect of a change in an exogenous variable on the proba 
bility that a worker/firm match leads to coverage for the worker.
Like Woodbury and Bettinger, Bloom and Freeman, and Even and 
Macpherson, we use household data to estimate a pension coverage 
equation. However, Bloom and Freeman and Even and Macpherson do 
not include a tax variable and maintain the hypothesis that changing 
tax rates have no effect on coverage. Woodbury and Bettinger, on the 
other hand, include a tax variable, but pool by age and gender. None of 
these authors have tested whether declines in tax rates contributed to 
the decline in coverage for young males. They also have not tested the 
hypothesis that declining tax rates put downward pressure on coverage 
rates for women, during a time period where observed coverage rates 
for women were rising.
To formalize the model, let Z represent a vector of worker and firm 
characteristics that affect the probability of coverage. 9 The equilibrium 
outcome is represented by an indicator variable, P, which takes a value 
of 1 if the worker is covered by a pension plan offered by the worker's 
firm. Let e represent a random variable interpreted as unobserved het 
erogeneity in the rates at which firms and workers are willing to substi 
tute pension benefits for wages. We can write the probability that 
worker / employed at firm j has pension coverage as:
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Prob(P=l) = F(Zg + <? > 0) = F(-Zg) (1)
where F is a cumulative distribution function and g is the vector of 
parameters to be estimated. We assume that e has a normal distribution 
and estimate a probit model.
Rather than report the estimated probit coefficients, g, we report 
the marginal effects of the continuous variables and the delta effects of 
the dichotomous variables. 9 The delta effect is the discrete analog of 
the marginal effect. We report f-statistics for the marginal and delta 
effects themselves. 10
DATA, VARIABLES, AND ENDOGENEITY
We use data from the 1979 and 1988 May Current Population Sur 
veys (CPS) and the 1993 April CPS, which include a special survey of 
workers concerning pension plan coverage and other employer 
attributes. These data have been matched to the March CPS of the 
same year, which provides income and other economic and demo 
graphic data. The sample is limited to full-time employed, private, 
wage and salary workers aged 21 to 55 who did not work in agriculture 
or the railroad industry and had valid responses to questions relevant 
for this study.
The dependent variable is worker self-reported pension plan partic 
ipation, which includes participation in both defined-benefit and 
defined-contribution plans. This is the best definition of pension cover 
age for our purposes because it represents the worker's intention to use 
a plan for retirement. Some workers who are in defined-contribution 
plans, which are like savings accounts, may intend to use those plans 
for preretirement consumption rather than for retirement and respond 
that they are not covered by a pension plan.
Most of our explanatory variables are standard in equations esti 
mating pension coverage. They include age, race, firm size, education, 
marital status, years with employer, and union status (Table 1). We 
also use nine industry and four occupation dichotomous variables.
In addition, we use two variables not universally included in pen 
sion coverage equations—the predicted combined state and federal
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marginal income tax rate and predicted yearly earnings at age 55. To 
avoid bias due to the endogeneity of earnings and thus marginal 
income tax rates, we use the predicted value of both variables. 11
We calculate the predicted marginal income tax rate, reflecting 
both state and federal income taxes, using current predicted family 
income (rather than actual family income), marital status, and number 
of children. These predicted tax rates are not subject to endogeneity 
bias arising from idiosyncratic variations in labor supply and earnings. 
To calculate marginal tax rates, we use the income tax codes for each 
of the 50 states for each of the three years of analysis. Marginal tax 
rate variability across states provides exogenous variation in tax rates.
Table 1 Variable Definitions
Variable________________________Definition__________ 
Covered Equals 1 if covered by a pension on the current job
Tax State plus federal marginal income tax rate based on
current predicted family earnings
Age Age in years
Pearn55 Predicted yearly earnings at age 55 in 1993 dollars,
assuming real earnings from the cross-sectional age/ 
earnings profile grow 1 percent annually
African American Equals 1 if African American 
Married Equals 1 if married with spouse present
Newhire Equals 1 if worked for current employer for no more than
one year
Union Equals 1 if covered by a collective bargaining agreement
Mult 1000 Equals 1 if employer operates at more than one location
and employs 1,000 or more workers
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Since the family income question in the CPS is retrospective, we use 
tax rates for the year prior to each CPSs. 12
The average predicted marginal income tax rate, state plus federal, 
for male workers aged 21-35 in our regression sample fell from 30.8 
percent in 1979 to 26.0 percent in 1988 and rose slightly to 26.1 percent 
in 1993. The average for workers aged 36-55 fell from 35.3 percent in 
1979 to 30.4 percent in 1988 and to 29.8 percent in 1993 (Table 2).
In addition to controlling for marginal tax rates, it is important to 
control for wealth or lifetime income. The argument for including 
such a measure is based on the normality of consumption during retire 
ment. Individuals who have greater earnings or wealth over their life 
time wish to consume more during retirement and thus have a higher 
demand for pension coverage. Because income and marginal income 
tax rates are positively correlated, if income is not adequately con 
trolled for, a finding of a significantly positive effect of marginal 
income tax rates on coverage could merely indicate that higher income 
workers have a higher demand for coverage.
Some authors, particularly Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Even 
and Macpherson (1994), include current earnings as a variable explain 
ing pension coverage. However, current earnings are endogenous and 
so the coefficient estimate on this variable is biased. The direction of 
the bias cannot be determined a priori. The estimated coefficient is 
likely to be upward biased if unobserved heterogeneity in ability is 
positively correlated with both earnings and pension coverage. How 
ever, compensating differentials for pension coverage would cause the 
coefficient on earnings to be downward biased since unobservables that 
are positively correlated with pension coverage may be negatively cor 
related with earnings.
Instead of using current earnings, we use the instrumental variables 
approach suggested by Dorsey (1982) and Woodbury and Bettinger 
(1991). First, for each data set we estimate an earnings equation, with 
a standard human capital formulation. Included in the explanatory 
variables is potential experience, measured as age minus years of edu 
cation minus 6. Using current job characteristics, we predict earnings 
for each individual at age 55. To do so, we assume that, in addition to 
age/earnings growth due to greater work experience as indicated by 
cross-sectional age earnings profiles, there is a 1 percent growth rate in 
real earnings over the life cycle. 13
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Table 2 Variable Means for Male Workers














































































SOURCE: 1979 and 1998 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979). 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The sample size is 5,496 in 1979, 6,241 in 1988, and 
6,157 in 1993.
a Predicted earnings at age 55, in units of 10,000 1993 dollars. The variable used in the 
regressions was transformed by taking logarithms.
The predicted earnings measure is affected not only by changes in 
the worker's current earnings but also by changes in the entire age/ 
earnings profile for workers of that gender for the given year. It is also 
affected by changes in the rate of return to experience, unionization, 
industry of employment, and firm size.
This measure of predicted earnings is then included as an explana 
tory variable in the coverage equation. In addition to circumventing 
the endogeneity problem associated with current earnings, the instru 
mental variable approach measures (although imperfectly) the earnings 
power of all individuals at the same age. The imprecision is greater for 
young workers, for whom we project for more years.
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Predicted earnings at age 55 for young male workers fell by $2,400 
(1993 dollars) between 1979 and 1988 and fell another $2,300 between 
1988 and 1993. The fall during the 1980s occurred because young 
males were moving to lower paid occupations and industries in greater 
numbers than older males. In addition, young males experienced rela 
tively large declines in unionization and in employment in large 
firms. 14
COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR MALE WORKERS
In this section, we present evidence from our data on the effect of 
the decline in income tax rates on the pension coverage of males. We 
examine effects separately for young and older workers for each of the 
three years of data.
We tested whether we could pool our data by age group, gender, or 
year, and the equality of coefficients across groups was always 
rejected. This result is in itself interesting because pension antidis 
crimination rules limit firms' ability to target specific groups of work 
ers. Whether a firm provides a pension to a worker should depend on 
the collective characteristics of the workers in the firm rather than the 
individual characteristics of the worker. Sorting in the labor market 
may account for the differing coefficients across age and gender 
groups.
Table 2 contains variable means for the three sample years while 
Tables 3 (young males) and 4 (older males) contain the estimates of the 
marginal effects for the continuous variables and the delta effects for 
the discrete variables.
A decline in marginal tax rates can result in reduced pension cov 
erage rates through several paths. Some firms may decide to terminate 
plans that have diminished value to their workers. New firms that oth 
erwise would have offered a pension plan may decide not to do so. 
Workers may change jobs, leaving firms offering a pension plan and 
moving to firms without one. Workers in firms where pension partici 
pation is optional may choose not to participate. Finally, workers 
entering the job market who would have otherwise sought firms offer-
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ing a pension plan may instead seek employment with nonpension 
firms.
The extent to which workers change their pension coverage status 
in reaction to a change in marginal tax rates depends on the extent of 
job change within the economy, which depends on the phase of the 
business cycle. It also depends on the length of time workers have had 
to adjust to tax rate changes and the length of time workers expect 
those new tax rates to be in effect. Workers in firms offering only a 
401(k) plan can adjust their pension status more quickly than other 
workers because they can simply decide not to participate in the plan. 
We do not attempt to distinguish by which path a change in marginal 
income tax rates influences pension coverage. Because of dynamic 
aspect of these factors, however, we expect the estimated tax coeffi 
cients to vary over time.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig 
nificant in all six of the male samples (Tables 3 and 4). 15 Thus, these 
results suggest that the decline in marginal tax rates during the 1980s 
reduced pension coverage for both young and older males.
The coefficient on predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and sig 
nificant for all samples. 16 Given the positive correlation between mar 
ginal income tax rates and employee income, the finding of significant 
positive effects for predicted earnings as well as taxes is important 
because it suggests that we have isolated separate income and tax 
effects. 17
One way to quantify the predicted effect of changes in tax rates on 
pension coverage is to multiply the estimated marginal effect of taxes 
by the observed change in taxes. This approach is equivalent to taking 
the difference in the predicted probabilities of coverage with mean tax 
in the base year and mean tax in the comparison year, evaluated at the 
means of the other variables in the base year. The difference in the pre 
dicted probabilities gives the change in the estimated probability attrib 
utable to the tax change for an "average" individual.
This approach has the weakness that the sum over changes in all 
variables does not equal the change in coverage predicted by the 
model. Even and Macpherson (1990) developed a technique without 
this defect for calculating the predicted effect of changes in one vari 
able. With their technique, the sum over changes in all variables is 
constrained to equal the total predicted change.
Marginal Tax Rates and Pension Coverage 485
Table 3 Marginal And Delta Effects for Young (age 21-35) Male 



































































SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa 
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded 
as dichotomous variables.
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Table 4 Marginal and Delta Effects for Older (age 36-55) Male 



































































SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993).
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, male, private, wage and salary workers aged 
21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to ques 
tions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for educa 
tion, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were coded 
as dichotomous variables.
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The predicted change in coverage between 1979 and 1988 is calcu 
lated:
N88 N19
EXP= IO(Z,88g88 )- ZO(Z/79£79 ), (2) 
1=1 1=1
where N88 is the number of observations in 1988, N19 is the number of 
observations in 1979, and O is the standard normal cumulative distri 
bution function. EXP is the average predicted coverage rate in 1988 
minus the average predicted coverage rate in 1979. Using 1988 as the 
base year, the portion of the predicted change attributable to changes in 
variable Zk is
EXPk = EXP*(ZM -Zm )gkW /[(ZM -Z19 )gw ]
where Z79 and Z88 are the vectors of variable means in 1979 and 
1988; and Zkl9 and Z^88 are the means of variable k in 1979 and 1988. 
A similar formula applies for base year 1988 in comparison to 1993.
Calculations of the effects of the changes in selected variables are 
presented in Table 5. These calculations indicate that the changes in 
marginal income tax rates, in the earnings measure, and in the percent 
age of the workforce covered by a union help explain the decline in 
pension coverage. 18 Our results regarding the effects of declining 
unionization and earnings are comparable to those found by Bloom 
and Freeman (1992) and by Even and Macpherson (1994). However, 
we find that between 1979 and 1988, the effect of declining taxes was 
twice as large for young workers as for older workers. Between 1988 
and 1993, for both young and older workers, the estimated effect is so 
small as to be economically insignificant.
A calculation indicates that pension coverage rate for males aged 
21 to 36 was 1 percentage point lower in 1993 than it would have been 
had the marginal tax rates in 1979 been in effect. 19 Dividing the esti 
mated effect due to the change in tax rates by the change in tax rates, 
we find that a 1 percentage point increase in marginal tax rates on aver 
age leads to a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates 
for this group.
As a test of robustness, we reestimate the model for males making 
three changes in the regression (Table 6). First, we pool the data. Sec-
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Table 5 Predicted Changes in Male Pension Coverage Attributed to 
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____ 
Variable_________1979-1988 1988-1993 1979-1988 1988-1993 

















NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba 
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979 
estimates of the probability of coverage. The percentage change attributable to 
changes in representation in manufacturing predicted a decline of 0.002 for young 
male workers and a rise of 0.002 for old male workers. Since the predicted change in 
coverage is sufficiently close to zero, we do not report the percentage of total pre 
dicted change attributable to underlying variables.
ond, we test for the effect of lagged taxes. Third, we use the log of cur 
rent salary rather than our permanent earnings variable. Our measure 
of lagged taxes is the tax rate that would have applied in the second and 
third years of our data had the tax laws applying to the first or second 
years of the data prevailed. The interpretation of the lagged variable is 
complicated. It can indicate the effect of a lag in adjustment to taxes. 
It can also indicate for a particular time period that workers view 
lagged taxes to be more representative of the long run tax regime than 
they view current taxes.
COVERAGE ESTIMATES FOR FEMALE WORKERS
We test the robustness of our estimated tax effects for males by 
reestimating the model using data on females from the 1979, 1988, and 
1993 CPS. The additional estimates of the marginal effect of taxes on 
pension coverage are an independent measure to assess the plausibility 
of our estimated tax effects for males. These comparisons across gen 
der are particularly useful because changes in average tax rates were
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Table 6 Estimated Marginal Tax Effects from Probit Regressions for 
Females, 1979,1988, and 1993 (/-statistics in parentheses)
Sample____________1979_________1988_________1993
Young females 0.0046 0.0048 0.004 
(2.28) (2.63) (2.09)
Older females 0.0073 0.0046 0.0040 
_______________(2.30)________(2.11)________(1.90)_____
SOURCE: 1979 and 1988 March and May Current Population Surveys and 1993 
March and April Current Population Surveys. The 1978 tax rates are from Commerce 
Clearinghouse (1979), 1987 and 1992 rates are from Advisory Commission (1988 
and 1993)
NOTE: The sample includes all full-time, female, private, wage and salary workers 
aged 21 to 55. The sample is further restricted to those who have valid responses to 
questions relevant to this study. The probit equation also contains four controls for 
education, four controls for occupation, and nine industry controls. All controls were 
coded as dichotomous variables.
similar for both men and women, while changes in coverage rates were 
not. While coverage for men declined, women generally experienced 
rising coverage rates during the 1980s.20
We estimate female pension coverage equations using the same 
specification used for males. To economize on space, we summarize 
results concerning tax effects (Table 6). Coverage rates for females in 
our sample rose by 0.5 percentage points between 1979 and 1988 and 
by 2 percentage points between 1988 and 1993. 21 The mean tax rates 
in each year are virtually identical to those of men and display a similar 
trend. 22
Predicted earnings at age 55 for females rose over the period. The 
increase in predicted earnings reflects the rising wages and narrowing 
of the gender gap in wages that women have experienced from the late 
1970s. In addition, the percentage of the workforce that is unionized 
fell by 50 percent between 1979 and 1993. The overall percentage 
decline in unionization is comparable to the percentage decline for 
men, although in absolute levels men are twice as likely to be union 
ized.
The percentage of women who were new hires, defined to have 
less than one year of tenure with the employer, fell from 19 to 18 per 
cent between 1979 and 1988 and then fell to 14 percent in 1993. Since
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eligibility for coverage usually requires some minimum level of tenure, 
the 4 percent decline in new hires is potentially important in explaining 
women's rising coverage rates between 1988 and 1993.
The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rates is positive and sig 
nificant in five of the six female samples. 23 It is similar in magnitude to 
the estimated coefficients in the male regressions.
Table 7 presents the total predicted change in coverage and the pre 
dicted change in coverage attributable to changes over time in marginal 
tax rates. As we did for men, we use the 1988 coefficients as the base 
from which to extrapolate. The change in coverage for women pre 
dicted by our model is much smaller than it is for men, consistent with 
their smaller change in coverage.
Table 7 Predicted Changes in Female Pension Coverage Attributed to 
Changes in Observed Characteristics
_____Age 21-35_____ _____Age 36-55____ 
______________1979-1988 1988-1993 1979-1988 1988-1993 














NOTE: These predicted changes are calculated using the 1988 estimates of the proba 
bility of coverage. Qualitatively similar predicted changes are found using the 1979 
estimates of the probability of coverage. Although the model predicts a 2.4 percentage 
point decline in coverage for young women between 1979 and 1988, almost all the 
change came about by changes in the estimated coefficients in the two years and not 
from changes in variable means. The decomposition described by Eq. 5 is meaning 
ful only if the denominator is not close to zero. When this occurs, the predicted 
change attributed to any one variable becomes implausibly large because of division 
by a number close to zero. Therefore, we do not report predicted changes attributable 
to individual variables for young women between 1979 and 1988.
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CONCLUSIONS
Private pension coverage rates for males declined during the 
1980s, especially for young males. Previous studies of pension cover 
age for young males have ignored the decline in marginal income tax 
rates. Using data from the 1979, 1988, and 1993 CPS Pension Supple 
ments, we find that the probability of coverage for an individual, in 
both our young and older samples, increases with increases in the mar 
ginal income tax rate. Declining marginal income tax rates are found 
to be nearly as important as the decline in unionism in explaining 
trends in coverage for young males. While our estimates vary, a rough 
summary indicates that a one percentage point increase in marginal tax 
rates causes a 0.4 percentage point increase in pension coverage rates. 
We find comparable tax effects for women.
Our results indicate that workers and firms react to changes in mar 
ginal income tax rates when making decisions concerning pension 
plans. Higher pension tax expenditures associated with higher mar 
ginal income tax rates "pay for" increased pension coverage.
Our results have implications for a number of issues not directly 
addressed in the paper. The decline in generosity of pension plans that 
many analysts believed occurred during the 1980s may have been due 
in part to the fall in marginal income tax rates. To the extent that pen 
sion saving is new saving, rather than replacing saving that would have 
occurred in another form, the decrease in marginal tax rates may have 
caused a decrease in savings. Finally, our results suggest that the 
reduction in tax rates partially paid for itself because the lower tax 
rates were associated with reduced tax expenditures on pensions.
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The opinions expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the authors and do not 
represent the position of the U.S. Department of Labor.
1. See Doescher (1994) for an extensive survey of studies on pension coverage.
2. We follow traditional usage and define coverage to indicate that a worker is a par 
ticipant in an employer-provided pension plan. When discussing 401(k) plans, we 
draw the distinction between being offered a plan and choosing to participate in it.
3. The primary legislative change in tax rates during the 1980s occurred with the 
passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which cut the top federal 
marginal income tax rate from 70 percent to 50 percent and reduced marginal 
income tax rates in all other brackets by 23 percentage points over three years. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the top rate on wealthiest households to 38 
percent, effective 1988. It provided for a transitional top rate of 38.5 percent, 
effective 1987. The highest rate in 1988 was 33 percent, which applied that year 
for single (unmarried head of household) [married couple] households with tax 
able income between $44,315 and $100,480 ($61,650 and $156,550) [$71,900 
and $192,930]. The brackets increased in subsequent years.
4. The basic tax rules concerning pensions were established in the Internal Revenue 
Acts of 1922, 1926, and 1928. Employer contributions to private pension plans 
are not treated as income to workers. The investment earnings on those contribu 
tions accrue tax free. Benefits are taxed under the federal and state personal 
income taxes when received.
5. If managers of firms decide on whether to offer pension plans based, in part, on 
the desirability of pension benefits to themselves, the decline in tax rates at upper 
income levels will also affect the probability that lower income workers have pen 
sion coverage.
6. In 1979, 26 percent of all male workers with tax rates below 10 percent were cov 
ered. Coverage rates rose to 75 percent for the 40-49 percent tax bracket. A sim 
ilar profile emerges from the 1988 and 1993 data.
7. We follow the convention of referring to the data by the year of the survey that it 
is from. The income data, and the income tax rate data derived from it, are for the 
year preceding the survey.
8. Since the unit of observation is a match between worker i and firm j, we should 
subscnpt the vector and subsequent stochastic terms by ij. However, for ease of 
notation we suppress these subscripts.
9. The probit estimates are available from the authors on request. 
10. The practice of reporting marginal effects of continuous regressors is standard to 
the literature (see Even and Macpherson 1994). The authors, however, use the 
same formula to calculate the marginal effects of discrete regressors. We instead 
report delta effects for discrete variables. We also report ^-statistics based on stan 
dard errors of the marginal and delta effects. These differ from the f-statistics on 
the coefficient estimates of the probit equation. We believe that our approach rep 
resents a technical improvement over previous work. The vanance-covariance 
matrix for the marginal and delta effects is calculated by pre- and post-multiply-
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ing the variance-covariance matrix of the probit estimates by the matrix of the 
derivatives of the vector of marginal and delta effects with respect to the elements 
in the vector g. The code is available on request.
11. Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994) criticized previous studies for not 
addressing the issue of the endogeneity of marginal tax rates. In principle, the 
worker's expected marginal income tax rates for all future years affect the demand 
for pensions. We do not pursue that approach empirically because of cohnearity.
12. State tax data for 1987 and 1992 are contained in reports of the Advisory Com 
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (1988, 1993). Data for 1978 were sup 
plied by Commerce Clearing House (1979). The marginal income tax rate is 
calculated as follows. First, we take the family income data from the CPS, which 
is categorical, and replace it with the mean family income in each category. Since 
the data on family income is top coded, we use IRS Statistics of Income tables to 
obtain average family income conditional on income exceeding the maximum 
reported by the CPS. We then use information on marital status and number of 
children in the family from the CPS, coupled with information about allowed 
exemptions and deductions from the federal and state income tax codes to obtain a 
measure of taxable income. Taxable income was calculated separately for state 
and federal tax purposes. The combined federal and state tax rates take into 
account the deducibility of state income taxes in computing federal income tax 
rates.
13. We experimented with a 2 percent growth rate and found our results to be robust 
to the assumption of 1 percent growth.
14 Unionism is another variable that previous studies have found to have an impor 
tant effect on pension coverage. Between 1979 and 1988, the percentage of work 
ers covered by a union contract dropped 11.7 and 9.3 percentage points for young 
and old workers, respectively. Between 1988 and 1993, these rates dropped an 
additional 4 1 and 5.4 percentage points. Although older workers are more likely 
to be covered by union contracts in all years, the magnitude of the decline in 
unionization was large for both groups
15. We found statistically significant positive effects for all samples when we entered 
marginal tax rates calculated from actual family earnings rather than predicted 
family earnings.
16. The reported ^-statistics are for the marginal and delta effects. The marginal and 
delta effects and their r-statistics are calculated by a nonlinear transformation of 
the probit estimates. Because of the nonlmeanty of the transformation, it does not 
preserve the r-values in the probit estimates. The transformation increases the t- 
value for variables with already large f-values, explaining the very large reported 
/-values for some of the earnings coefficients.
17. In addition, we find the standard results that pension coverage increases with 
earnings, education, firm size, union status, and a marital status dichotomous vari 
able (l=married). When we entered age in regressions not shown, it is insignifi 
cant, age having been controlled for already in the choice of samples.
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18. For the calculations for both 1979 to 1988 and 1988 to 1993, we use 1988 as the 
base year. These calculations are entirely based on statistically significant esti 
mated coefficients.
19. We calculate this by multiplying the predicted tax effect on coverage rates by the 
number of male full-time private sector wage and salary workers not covered by a 
pension plan (U.S. Department of Labor 1994).
20. Between 1988 and 1993, young women experienced a slight decline
21. As with males, the coverage rates within the sample exceed the population cover 
age rates due to restrictions on valid responses to questions used in the regression 
analysis.
22. This is not surprising since marginal tax rates are based on family income.
23. The predicted earnings at age 55 is positive and significant, which suggests that 
the tax effect has been isolated.
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